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Abstract
Planned experiments are the gold standard in reliably comparing the causal effect
of switching from a baseline policy to a new policy. One critical shortcoming of classi-
cal experimental methods, however, is that they typically do not take into account the
dynamic nature of response to policy changes. For instance, in an experiment where
we seek to understand the effects of a new ad pricing policy on auction revenue, agents
may adapt their bidding in response to the experimental pricing changes. Thus, causal
effects of the new pricing policy after such adaptation period, the long-term causal
effects, are not captured by the classical methodology even though they clearly are
more indicative of the value of the new policy. Here, we formalize a framework to
define and estimate long-term causal effects of policy changes in multiagent economies.
Central to our approach is behavioral game theory, which we leverage to formulate the
ignorability assumptions that are necessary for causal inference. Under such assump-
tions we estimate long-term causal effects through a latent space approach, where a
behavioral model of how agents act conditional on their latent behaviors is combined
with a temporal model of how behaviors evolve over time.
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1 Introduction
A multiagent economy is comprised of agents interacting under specific economic rules. A
common problem of interest is to experimentally evaluate changes to such rules, also known
as treatments, on an objective of interest. For example, an online ad auction platform is
a multiagent economy, where one problem is to estimate the effect of raising the reserve
price on the platform’s revenue. Assessing causality of such effects is a challenging problem
because there is a conceptual discrepancy between what needs to be estimated and what is
available in the data, as illustrated in Figure 1.
What needs to be estimated is the causal effect of a policy change, which is defined as
the difference between the objective value when the economy is treated, i.e., when all agents
interact under the new rules, relative to when the same economy is in control, i.e., when all
agents interact under the baseline rules. Such definition of causal effects is logically necessi-
tated from the designer’s task, which is to select either the treatment or the control policy
based on their estimated revenues, and then apply such policy to all agents in the economy.
The long-term causal effect is the causal effect defined after the system has stabilized, and is
more representative of the value of policy changes in dynamical systems. Thus, in Figure 1
the long-term causal effect is the difference between the objective values at the top and
bottom endpoints, marked as the “targets of inference”.
What is available in the experimental data, however, typically comes from designs such
as the so-called A/B test, where we randomly assign some agents to the treated economy
(new rules B) and the others to the control economy (baseline rules A), and then compare
the outcomes. In Figure 1 the experimental data are depicted as the solid time-series in the
middle of the plot, marked as the “observed data”.
Therefore the challenge in estimating long-term causal effects is that we generally need
to perform two inferential tasks simultaneously, namely,
(i) infer outcomes across possible experimental assignments (y-axis in Figure 1), and
(ii) infer long-term outcomes from short-term experimental data (x-axis in Figure 1).
The first task is commonly known as the “fundamental problem of causal inference” (Hol-
land, 1986; Rubin, 2011) because it underscores the impossibility of observing in the same
experiment the outcomes for both policy assignments that define the causal effect; i.e., that
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Figure 1: The two inferential tasks for causal inference in multiagent economies. First, infer agent
actions across treatment assignments (y-axis), particularly, the assignment where all agents are
in the treated economy (top assignment, Z = 1), and the assignment where all agents are in the
control economy (bottom assignment, Z = 0). Second, infer across time, from t0 (last observation
time) to long-term T . What we seek in order to evaluate the causal effect of the new treatment is
the difference between the objectives (e.g., revenue) at the two inferential target endpoints.
we cannot observe in the same experiment both the outcomes when all agents are treated
and the outcomes when all agents are in control, the assignments of which are denoted by
Z = 1 and Z = 0, respectively, in Figure 1. In fact the role of experimental design, as
conceived by Fisher (1935), is exactly to quantify the uncertainty about such causal effects
that cannot be observed due to the aforementioned fundamental problem, by using standard
errors that can be observed in a carefully designed experiment.
The second task, however, is unique to causal inference in dynamical systems, such as
the multiagent economies that we study in this paper, and has received limited attention so
far. Here, we argue that it is crucial to study long-term causal effects, i.e., effects measured
after the system has stabilized, because such effects are more representative of the value of
policy changes. If our analysis focused only on the observed data part depicted in Figure 1,
then policy evaluation would reflect transient effects that might differ substantially from the
long-term effects. For instance, raising the reserve price in an auction might increase revenue
in the short-term but as agents adapt their bids, or switch to another platform altogether,
the long-term effect could be a net decrease in revenue (Holland and Miller, 1991).
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1.1 Related work and our contributions
There have been several important projects related to causal inference in multiagent economies.
For instance, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011) evaluated the effects of an increase in the reserve
price of Yahoo! ad auctions on revenue. Auctions were randomly assigned to an increased
reserve price treatment, and the effect was estimated using difference-in-differences (DID),
which is a popular econometric method (Card and Krueger, 1994; Donald and Lang, 2007;
Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011). The DID method compares the difference in outcomes before
and after the intervention for both the treated and control units —the ad auctions in this
experiment— and then compares the two differences. In relation to Figure 1, DID extrap-
olates across assignments (y-axis) and across time (x-axis) by making a strong additivity
assumption (Abadie, 2005; Angrist and Pischke, 2008, Section 5.2), specifically, by assuming
that the dependence of revenue on reserve price and time is additive.
In a structural approach, Athey et al. (2011) studied the effects of auction format (as-
cending versus sealed bid) on competition for timber tracts. Their approach was to estimate
agent valuations from observed data (agent bids) in one auction format and then impute
counterfactual bid distributions in the other auction format, under the assumption of equi-
librium play in the observed data. In relation to Figure 1, their approach extrapolates across
assignments by assuming that agent individual valuations for tracts are independent of the
treatment assignment, and extrapolates across time by assuming that the observed agent bids
are already in equilibrium. Similar approaches are followed in econometrics for estimation
of general equilibrium effects (Heckman et al., 1998; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005).
In a causal graph approach (Pearl, 2000), Bottou et al. (2013) studied effects of changes in
the algorithm that scores Bing ads on the ad platform’s revenue. Their approach was to create
a directed acyclic graph (DAG) among related variables, such as queries, bids, and prices.
Through a “Causal Markov” assumption they could predict counterfactuals for revenue,
using only data from the control economy (observational study). In relation to Figure 1,
their approach is non-experimental and extrapolates across assignments and across time by
assuming a directed acyclic graph (DAG) as the correct data model, which is also assumed to
be stable with respect to treatment assignment, and by estimating counterfactuals through
the fitted model.
Our work is different from prior work because it takes into account the short-term aspect
of experimental data to evaluate long-term causal effects, which is the key conceptual and
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practical challenge that arises in empirical applications. In contrast, classical econometric
methods, such as DID, assume strong linear trends from short-term to long-term, whereas
structural approaches typically assume that the experimental data are already long-term as
they are observed in equilibrium. We refer the reader to Sections 2 and 3 of the supplement
for more detailed comparisons.
In summary, our key contribution is that we develop a formal framework that (i) artic-
ulates the distinction between short-term and long-term causal effects, (ii) leverages behav-
ioral game-theoretic models for causal analysis of multiagent economies, and (iiii) explicates
theory that enables valid inference of long-term causal effects.
2 Definitions
Consider a set of agents I and a set of actions A, indexed by i and a, respectively. The
experiment designer wants to run an experiment to evaluate a new policy against the baseline
policy relative to an objective. In the experiment each agent is assigned to one policy, and
the experimenter observes how agents act over time. Formally, let Z = (Zi) be the |I| × 1
assignment vector where Zi = 1 denotes that agent i is assigned to the new policy, and
Zi = 0 denotes that i is assigned to the baseline policy; as a shorthand, Z = 1 denotes that
all agents are assigned to the new policy, and Z = 0 denotes that all agents are assigned
to the baseline policy, where 1, 0 generally denote an appropriately-sized vector of ones
and zeroes, respectively. In the simplest case, the experiment is an A/B test, where Z is
uniformly random on {0, 1}|I| subject to ∑i Zi = |I|/2.
After the initial assignment Z agents play actions at discrete time points from t = 0
to t = t0. Let Ai(t;Z) ∈ A be the random variable that denotes the action of agent i
at time t under assignment Z. The population action αj(t;Z) ∈ ∆|A|, where ∆p denotes
the p-dimensional simplex, is the frequency of actions at time t under assignment Z of
agents that were assigned to game j; for example, assuming two actions A = {a1, a2}, then
α1(0;Z) = [0.2, 0.8] denotes that, under assignment Z, 20% of agents assigned to the new
policy play action a1 at t = 0, while the rest play a2. We assume that the objective value
for the experimenter depends on the population action, in a similar way that, say, auction
revenue depends on agents’ aggregate bidding. The objective value in policy j at time t
under assignment Z is denoted by R(αj(t;Z)), where R : ∆
|A| → R. For instance, suppose
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in the previous example that a1 and a2 produce revenue $10 and −$2, respectively, each time
they are played, then R is linear and R([.2, .8]) = 0.2 · $10− 0.8 · $2 = $0.4.
Definition 1. The average causal effect on objective R at time t of the new policy relative
to the baseline is denoted by CE(t) and is defined as
CE(t) = E (R(α1(t; 1))−R(α0(t; 0))) . (1)
Suppose that (t0, T ] is the time interval required for the economy to adapt to the ex-
perimental conditions. The exact definition of T is important but we defer this discussion
for Section 3.1. The designer concludes that the new policy is better than the baseline if
CE(T ) > 0. Thus, CE(T ) is the long-term average causal effect and is a function of two
objective values, R(α1(T ; 1)) and R(α0(T ; 0)), which correspond to the two inferential target
endpoints in Figure 1. Neither value is observed in the experiment because agents are ran-
domly split between policies, and their actions are observed only for the short-term period
[0, t0]. Thus we need to (i) extrapolate across assignments by pivoting from the observed
assignment to the counterfactuals Z = 1 and Z = 0; (ii) extrapolate across time from the
short-term data [0, t0] to the long-term t = T . We perform these two extrapolations based
on a latent space approach, which is described next.
2.1 Behavioral and temporal models
We assume a latent behavioral model of how agents select actions, inspired by models from
behavioral game theory. The behavioral model is used to predict agent actions conditional
on agent behaviors, and is combined with a temporal model to predict behaviors in the
long-term. The two models are ultimately used to estimate agent actions in the long-term,
and thus estimate long-term causal effects. As the choice of the latent space is not unique,
in Section 3.1 we discuss why we chose to use behavioral models from game theory.
Let Bi(t;Z) denote the behavior that agent i adopts at time t under experimental as-
signment Z. The following assumption puts a constraints on the space of possible behaviors
that agents can adopt, which will simplify the subsequent analysis.
Assumption 1 (Finite set of possible behaviors). There is a fixed and finite set of behaviors
B such that for every time t, assignment Z and agent i, it holds that Bi(t;Z) ∈ B; i.e., every
agent can only adopt a behavior from B.
6
The set of possible behaviors B essentially defines a |B|×|A| collection of probabilities that
is sufficient to compute the likelihood of actions played conditional on adopted behavior—we
refer to such collection as the behavioral model.
Definition 2 (Behavioral model). The behavioral model for policy j defined by set B of
behaviors is the collection of probabilities
P (Ai(t;Z) = a|Bi(t;Z) = b,Gj),
for every action a ∈ A and every behavior b ∈ B, where Gj denotes the characteristics of
policy j.
As an example, a non-sophisticated behavior b0 could imply that P (Ai(t;Z) = a|b0, Gj) =
1/|A|, i.e., that the agent adopting b0 simply plays actions at random. Conditioning on
policy j in Definition 2 allows an agent to choose its actions based on expected payoffs,
which depend on the policy characteristics. For instance, in the application of Section 4 we
consider a behavioral model where an agent picks actions in a two-person game according to
expected payoffs calculated from the game-specific payoff matrix—in that case Gj is simply
the payoff matrix of game j.
The population behavior βj(t;Z) ∈ ∆|B| denotes the frequency at time t under assignment
Z of the adopted behaviors of agents assigned to policy j. Let Ft denote the entire history
of population behaviors in the experiment up to time t. A temporal model of behaviors is
defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Temporal model). For an experimental assignment Z a temporal model for
policy j is a collection of parameters φj(Z), ψj(Z), and densities (pi, f), such that for all t,
βj(0;Z) ∼ pi(·;φj(Z)),
βj(t;Z)| Ft−1, Gj ∼ f(·|ψj(Z),Ft−1). (2)
A temporal model defines the distribution of population behavior as a time-series with
a Markovian structure subject to pi and f being stable with respect to Z. In other words,
regardless of how agents are assigned to games, the population behavior in the game will
evolve according to a fixed model described by f and pi. The model parameters φ, ψ may
still depend on the treatment assignment Z.
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3 Estimation of long-term causal effects
Here we develop the assumptions that are necessary for inference of long-term causal effects.
Assumption 2 (Stability of initial behaviors). Let ρZ =
∑
i∈I Zi/|I| be the proportion of
agents assigned to the new policy under assignment Z. Then, for every possible Z,
ρZβ1(0;Z) + (1− ρZ)β0(0;Z) = β(0), (3)
where β(0) is a fixed population behavior invariant to Z.
Assumption 3 (Behavioral ignorability). The assignment is independent of population be-
havior at time t, conditional on policy and behavioral history up to t; i.e., for every t > 0
and policy j,
Z |= βj(t;Z) | Ft−1, Gj.
Remarks. Assumption 2 implies that the agents do not anticipate the assignment Z as
they “have made up their minds” to adopt a population behavior β(0) before the experiment.
It follows that the population behavior β1(t;Z) marginally corresponds to ρZ |I| draws from
|B| bins of total size |I|β(0). The bin selection probabilities at every draw depend on the
experimental design; for instance, in an A/B experiment where ρZ = 0.5 the population
behavior at t = 0 can be sampled uniformly such that β1(0;Z)+β0(0;Z) = 2β
(0). Quantities
such as that in Eq. (3) are crucial in causal inference because they can be used as a pivot
for extrapolation across assignments.
Assumption 3 states that the treatment assignment does not add information about the
population behavior at time t, if we already know the full behavioral history of up to t, and
the policy which agents are assigned to; hence, the treatment assignment is conditionally
ignorable. This ignorability assumption precludes, for instance, an agent adopting a different
behavior depending on whether it was assigned with friends or foes in the experiment.
Algorithm 1 is the main methodological contribution of this paper. It is a Bayesian
procedure as it puts priors on parameters φ, ψ of the temporal model, and then marginalizes
these parameters out.
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Algorithm 1 Estimation of long-term causal effects.
Input: Z, T,A,B, G1, G0,D1 = {a1(t;Z) : t = 0, . . . , t0},D0 = {a0(t;Z) : t = 0, . . . , t0}
Output: Estimate of long-term causal effect CE(T ) in Eq. (1).
1: By Assumption 3, define φj ≡ φj(Z), ψj ≡ ψj(Z).
2: Set µ1 ← 0 and µ0 ← 0, both of size |A|; set ν0 = ν1 = 0.
3: for iter = 1, 2, . . . do
4: For j = 0, 1, sample φj, ψj from prior, and sample βj(0;Z) conditional on φj.
5: Calculate β(0) = ρZβ1(0;Z) + (1− ρZ)β0(0;Z).
6: for j = 0, 1 do
7: Set βj(0; j1) = β
(0).
8: Sample Bj = {βj(t; j1) : t = 0, . . . , T} given ψj and βj(0, j1). #temporal model
9: Sample αj(T ; j1) conditional on βj(T ; j1). #behavioral model
10: Set µj ← µj + P (Dj|Bj, Gj) ·R(αj(T ; j1)).
11: Set νj ← νj + P (Dj|Bj, Gj).
12: end for
13: end for
14: Return estimate ĈE(T ) = µ1/ν1 − µ0/ν0.
Theorem 1 (Estimation of long-term causal effects). Suppose that behaviors evolve ac-
cording to a known temporal model, and actions are distributed conditionally on behaviors
according to a known behavioral model. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold for
such models. Then, for every policy j ∈ {0, 1} as the iterations of Algorithm 1 increase,
µj/νj → E (R(αj(T ; j1))|Dj) . The output ĈE(T ) of Algorithm 1 asymptotically estimates
the long-term causal effect, i.e.,
E(ĈE(T )) = E (R(α1(T ; 1))−R(α0(T ; 0))) ≡ CE(T ).
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Remarks. Theorem 1 shows that ĈE(T ) consistently estimates the long-term causal
effect in Eq. (1). We note that it is also possible to derive the variance of this estimator
with respect to the randomization distribution of assignment Z. To do so we first create a
set of assignments Z by repeatedly sampling Z according to the experimental design. Then
we adapt Algorithm 1 so that (i) Step 4 is removed; (ii) in Step 5, β(0) is sampled from its
posterior distribution conditional on observed data, which can be obtained from the original
Algorithm 1. The empirical variance of the outputs over Z from the adapted algorithm
estimates the variance of the output ĈE(T ) of the original algorithm. We leave the full
characterization of this variance estimation procedure for future work.
As Theorem 1 relies on Assumptions 2 and 3, it is worth noting that the assumptions may
be hard but not impossible to test in practice. For example, one idea to test Assumption 3 is
to use data from multiple experiments on a single game j. If fitting the temporal model (2) on
such data yields parameter estimates (φj(Z), ψj(Z)) that depend on experimental assignment
Z, then Assumption 3 would be unjustified. A similar test could be used for Assumption 2
as well.
3.1 Discussion
Methodologically, our approach is aligned with the idea that for long-term causal effects we
need a model for outcomes that leverages structural information pertaining to how outcomes
are generated and how they evolve. In our application such structural information is the
microeconomic information that dictates what agent behaviors are successful in a given
policy and how these behaviors evolve over time.
In particular, Step 1 in the algorithm relies on Assumptions 2 and 3 to infer that model
parameters, φj, ψj are stable with respect to treatment assignment. Step 5 of the algorithm
is the key estimation pivot, which uses Assumption 2 to extrapolate from the experimental
assignment Z to the counterfactual assignments Z = 1 and Z = 0, as required in our
problem. Having pivoted to such counterfactual assignment, it is then possible to use the
temporal model parameters ψj, which are unaffected by the pivot under Assumption 3, to
sample population behaviors up to long-term T , and subsequently sample agent actions at
T (Steps 8 and 9).
Thus, a lot of burden is placed on the behavioral game-theoretic model to predict agent
actions, and the accuracy of such models is still not settled (Hahn et al., 2015). However,
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it does not seem necessary that such prediction is completely accurate, but rather that the
behavioral models can pull relevant information from data that would otherwise be inacces-
sible without game theory, thereby improving over classical methods. A formal assessment
of such improvement, e.g., using information theory, is open for future work. An empirical
assessment can be supported by the extensive literature in behavioral game theory (Stahl
and Wilson, 1994; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), which has been successful in predicting
human actions in real-world experiments (Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2010).
Another limitation of our approach is Assumption 1, which posits that there is a finite set
of predefined behaviors. A nonparametric approach where behaviors are estimated on-the-fly
might do better. In addition, the long-term horizon, T , also needs to be defined a priori.
We should be careful how T interferes with the temporal model since such a model implies
a time T ′ at which population behavior reaches stationarity. Thus if T ′ ≤ T we implicitly
assume that the long-term causal effect of interest pertains to a stationary regime (e.g., Nash
equilibrium), but if T ′ > T we assume that the effect pertains to a transient regime, and
therefore the policy evaluation might be misguided.
4 Application on data from a behavioral experiment
In this section, we apply our methodology to experimental data from Rapoport and Boebel
(1992), as reported by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). The experiment consisted of a series
of zero-sum two-agent games, and aimed at examining the hypothesis that human players
play according to minimax solutions of the game, the so-called minimax hypothesis initially
suggested by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Here we repurpose the data in a
slightly artificial way, including how we construct the designer’s objective. This enables a
suitable demonstration of our approach.
Each game in the experiment was a simultaneous-move game with five discrete actions
for the row player and five actions for the column player. The structure of the payoff matrix,
given in the supplement in Table 1, is parametrized by two values, namely W and L; the
experiment used two different versions of payoff matrices, corresponding to payments by
the row agent to the column agent when the row agent won (W ), or lost (L): modulo
a scaling factor Rapoport and Boebel (1992) used (W,L) = ($10,−$6) for game 0 and
(W,L) = ($15,−$1) for game 1.
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Forty agents, I = {1, 2, . . . , 40}, were randomized to one game design (20 agents per
game), and each agent played once as row and once as column, matched against two different
agents. Every match-up between a pair of agents lasted for two periods of 60 rounds, with
each round consisting of a selection of an action from each agent and a payment. Thus,
each agent played for four periods and 240 rounds in total. If Z is the entire assignment
vector of length 40, Zi = 1 means that agent i was assigned to game 1 with payoff matrix
(W,L) = ($15,−$1) and Zi = 0 means that i was assigned to game 0 with payoff matrix
(W,L) = ($10,−$6).
In adapting the data, we take advantage of the randomization in the experiment, and
ask a question in regard to long-term causal effects. In particular, assuming that agents pay
a fee for each action taken, which accounts for the revenue of the game, we ask the following
question:
What is the long-term causal effect on revenue if we switch from payoffs (W,L) =
($10,−$6) of game 0 to payoffs (W,L) = ($15,−$1) of game 1?”.
The games induced by the two aforementioned payoff matrices represent the two different
policies we wish to compare. To evaluate our method, we consider the last period as long-
term, and hold out data from this period. We define the causal estimand in Eq. (1) as
CE = cᵀ(α1(T ; 1)− α0(T ; 0)), (4)
where T = 3 and c is a vector of coefficients. The interpretation is that, given an element ca
of c, the agent playing action a is assumed to pay a constant fee ca. To check the robustness
of our method we test Algorithm 1 over multiple values of c.
4.1 Implementation of Algorithm 1 and results
Here we demonstrate how Algorithm 1 can be applied to estimate the long-term causal effect
in Eq. (4) on the Rapoport & Boebel dataset. To this end we clarify Algorithm 1 step by
step, and give more details in the supplement.
Step 1: Model parameters. For simplicity we assume that the models in the two
games share common parameters, and thus (φ1, ψ1, λ1) = (φ0, ψ0, λ0) ≡ (φ, ψ, λ), where λ
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are the parameters of the behavioral model to be described in Step 8. Having common
parameters also acts as regularization and thus helps estimation.
Step 4: Sampling parameters and initial behaviors As explained later we assume
that there are 3 different behaviors and thus φ, ψ, λ are vectors with 3 components. Let
x ∼ U(m,M) denote that every component of x is uniform on (m,M), independently.
We choose diffuse priors for our parameters, specifically, φ ∼ U(0, 10), ψ ∼ U(−5, 5), and
λ ∼ U(−10, 10). Given φ we sample the initial behaviors as Dirichlet, i.e., β1(0;Z) ∼ Dir(φ)
and β0(0;Z) ∼ Dir(φ), independently.
Steps 5 & 7: Pivot to counterfactuals. Since we have a completely randomized
experiment (A/B test) it holds that ρZ = 0.5 and therefore β
(0) = 0.5(β1(0;Z) + β0(0;Z)).
Now we can pivot to the counterfactual population behaviors under Z = 1 and Z = 0 by
setting β1(0; 1) = β0(0; 0) = β
(0).
Step 8: Sample counterfactual behavioral history. As the temporal model, we
adopt the lag-one vector autoregressive model, also known as VAR(1). We transform1 the
population behavior into a new variable wt = logit(β1(t; 1)) ∈ R2 (also do so for β0(t; 0)).
Such transformation with a unique inverse is necessary because population behaviors are
constrained on the simplex, and thus form so-called compositional data (Aitchison, 1986;
Grunwald et al., 1993). The VAR(1) model implies that
wt = ψ[1]1 + ψ[2]wt−1 + ψ[3]t,
where ψ[k] is the kth component of ψ and t ∼ N (0, I) is i.i.d. standard bivariate normal.
Eq. (6) is used to sample the behavioral history, Bj, in Step 8 of Algorithm 1.
Step 9: Behavioral model. For the behavioral model, we adopt the quantal p-response
(QLp) model (Stahl and Wilson, 1994), which has been successful in predicting human actions
in real-world experiments (Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2010). We choose p = 3 behaviors,
namely B = {b0, b1, b2} of increased sophistication parametrized by λ = (λ[1], λ[2], λ[3]) ∈ R3.
Let Gj denote the 5×5 payoff matrix of game j and let the term strategy denote a distribution
over all actions. An agent with behavior b0 plays the uniform strategy,
P (Ai(t;Z) = a|Bi(t;Z) = b0, Gj) = 1/5.
1y = logit(x) is defined as the function ∆m → Rm−1, y[i] = log(x[i+ 1]/x[1]), where x[1] 6= 0 wlog.
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An agent of level-1 (row player) assumes to be playing only against level-0 agents and thus
expects per-action profit u1 = (1/5)Gj1 (for column player we use the transpose of Gj). The
level-1 agent will then play a strategy proportional to eλ[1]u1 , where ex for vector x denotes
the element-wise exponentiation, ex = (ex[k]). The precision parameter λ[1] determines how
much an agent insists on maximizing expected utility; for example, if λ[1] = ∞, the agent
plays the action with maximum expected payoff (best response); if λ[1] = 0, the agent acts
as a level-0 agent. An agent of level-2 (row player) assumes to be playing only against level-1
agents with precision λ[2] and therefore expects to face strategy proportional to eλ[2]u1 . Thus
its expected per-action profit is u2 ∝ Gjeλ[2]u1 , and plays strategy ∝ eλ[3]u2 .
Given Gj and λ we calculate a 5 × 3 matrix Qj where the kth column is the strat-
egy played by an agent with behavior bk−1. The expected population action is there-
fore α¯j(t;Z) = Qjβj(t;Z). The population action αj(t;Z) is distributed as a normalized
multinomial random variable with expectation α¯j(t;Z), and so P (αj(t; 1)|βj(t; 1), Gj) =
Multi(|I| · αj(t; 1); α¯j(t; 1)), where Multi(n; p) is the multinomial density of observations
n = (n1, . . . , nK) with probabilities p = (p1, . . . , pK). Hence, the full likelihood for observed
actions in game j in Steps 10 and 11 of Algorithm 1 is given by the product
P (Dj|Bj, Gj) =
T−1∏
t=0
Multi(|I| · αj(t; j1); α¯j(t; j1)).
Running Algorithm 1 on the Rapoport and Boebel dataset yields the estimates shown
in Figure 2, for 25 different fee vectors c, where each component ca is sampled uniformly at
random from (0, 1). We also test difference-in-differences (DID), which estimates the causal
effect through
τˆ did = [R(α1(2;Z))−R(α1(0;Z))]− [R(α0(2;Z))−R(α0(0;Z))],
and a naive method (“naive” in the plot), which ignores the dynamical aspect and estimates
the long-term causal effect as τˆnai = [R(α1(2;Z))−R(α0(2;Z))].
Our estimates (“LACE” in the plot) are closer to the truth (mse = 0.045) than the
estimates from the naive method (mse = 0.185) and from DID (mse = 0.361). This illustrates
that our method can pull game-theoretic information from the data for long-term causal
inference, whereas the other methods cannot.
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Figure 2: Estimates of long-term effects from different methods corresponding to 25 random
objective coefficients c in Eq. (4). For estimates of our method we ran Algorithm 1 for 100
iterations.
5 Conclusion
One critical shortcoming of statistical methods of causal inference is that they typically do
not assess the long-term effect of policy changes. Here we combined causal inference and
game theory to build a framework for estimation of such long-term effects in multiagent
economies. Central to our approach is behavioral game theory, which provides a natural
latent space model of how agents act and how their actions evolve over time. Such models
enable to predict how agents would act under various policy assignments and at various time
points, which is key for valid causal inference. Working on data from an actual behavioral
experiment set we showed how our framework can be applied to estimate the long-term effect
of changing the payoff structure of a normal-form game.
Our framework could be extended in future work by incorporating learning (e.g., ficti-
tious play, bandits, no-regret learning) to better model the dynamic response of multiagent
systems to policy changes. Another interesting extension would be to use our framework for
optimal design of experiments in such systems, which needs to account for heterogeneity in
agent learning capabilities and for intrinsic dynamical properties of the systems’ responses
to experimental treatments.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 (Estimation of long-term causal effects). Suppose that behaviors evolve ac-
cording to a known temporal model, and actions are distributed conditionally on behaviors
according to a known behavioral model. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold for
such models. Then, for every policy j ∈ {0, 1} as the iterations of Algorithm 1 increase,
µj/νj → E (R(αj(T ; j1))|Dj) . The output ĈE(T ) of Algorithm 1 asymptotically estimates
the long-term causal effect, i.e.,
E(ĈE(T )) = E (R(α1(T ; 1))−R(α0(T ; 0))) ≡ CE(T ).
Proof. Fix a policy j in Algorithm 1 and drop the subscript j in the notation of the algorithm.
Therefore we can write:
ω ≡ (φj, ψj, Bj)
α ≡ αj(T ; j1)
P (D|ω) ≡ P (Dj|Bj, Gj).
The way Algorithm 1 is defined, as the iterations increase the variable µ is estimating
limµ =
∫
R(α)P (D|ω)p(α, ω)dωdα.
We now rewrite this integral as follows.
limµ =
∫
R(α)P (D|ω)p(α, ω)dωdα =
∫
R(α)P (D|α, ω)p(α, ω)dωdα [ p(D|α, ω) = P (D|ω) ]
=
∫
R(α)P (α, ω|D)P (D)dωdα [by Bayes theorem ]
= P (D)
∫
R(α)P (α|D)dα [ω is marginalized out ]
= P (D)E (R(α)|D) .
The first equation, p(D|α, ω) = P (D|ω), holds by definition of the behavioral model: the
history of latent behaviors is sufficient for the likelihood of observed actions. Another way
to phrase this is that conditional on latent behavior the observed action is independent from
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any other variable.
Similarly, as the iterations increase the variable ν is estimating
lim ν =
∫
P (D|ω)p(α, ω)dωdα.
We now rewrite this integral as follows.
lim ν =
∫
P (D|ω)p(α, ω)dωdα =
∫
P (D|α, ω)p(α, ω)dωdα [because p(D|α, ω) = P (D|ω) ]
=
∫
P (α, ω|D)P (D)dωdα [by Bayes theorem ]
= P (D)
∫
P (α|D)dα
= P (D).
By the continuous mapping theorem we conclude that
limµ/ν → E (R(α)|D) .
Thus E (limµ1/ν1) = E (R(α1(T ; 1))) and E (limµ0/ν0) = E (R(α0(T ; 0))) and so
E (limµ1/ν1)− E (limµ0/ν0)→ E (R(α1(T ; 1)))− E (R(α0(T ; 0))) ,
i.e., Algorithm 1 consistently estimates the long-term causal effect.
B Connection of assumptions to policy invariance
Assumption 3 in our framework is related to policy invariance assumptions in econometrics
of policy effects (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman et al., 1998). Intuitively, policy
invariance posits that given the choice of policy by an agent, the initial process that resulted
in this choice does not affect the outcome. For example, given that an individual chooses
to participate in a tax benefit program, the way the individual was assigned to the program
(e.g., lottery, recommendation, or point of a gun) does not alter the outcome that will
be observed for that individual. Our assumption is different because we have a temporal
evolution of population behavior and there is no free choice of an agent about the assignment,
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since we assume a randomized experiment. But our assumption shares the essential aspect
of conditional ignorability of assignment that is crucial in causal inference.
C Discussion of related methods
Consider the estimand for the Rapoport-Boebel experiment (Rapoport and Boebel, 1992):
τ = cᵀ(α1(T ; 1)− α0(T ; 0)).
Here we discuss how standard methods would estimate such estimand. Our goal is to illus-
trate the fundamental assumptions underpinning each method, and compare with our As-
sumptions 2 and 3. To illustrate we will assume a specific value c = (0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1)ᵀ.
In discussing these methods, we will mostly be concerned with how point estimates compare
to the true value of the estimand, which here is τ = $0.054 using the experimental data in
Table 2.
The naive approach would be to consider only the latest observed time point (t0 = 2)
under the experiment assignment Z, and use the observed population actions under Z as an
estimate for τ ; i.e.,
τˆnaive = cᵀ(α1(t0;Z)− α0(t0;Z)) = −$0.051.
But for this estimate to be unbiased for τ , we generally require that
α1(t0;Z)− α0(t0;Z) = α1(T ; 1)− α0(T ; 0).
The naive estimate therefore makes a direct extrapolation from t = t0 to t = T and from the
observed assignment Z to the counterfactual assignments Z = 1 and Z = 0. This ignores,
among other things, the dynamic nature of agent actions.
A more sophisticated approach is to analyze the agent actions as a time series. For exam-
ple, Brodersen et al. (2014) developed a method to estimate the effects of ad campaigns on
website visits. Their method was based on the idea of “synthetic controls”, i.e., they created
a time-series using different sources of information that would act as the counterfactual to the
observed time-series after the intervention. However, their problem is macroeconometric and
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they work with observational data. Thus, there is neither experimental randomized assign-
ment to games, nor strategic interference between agents, nor dynamic agent actions. More
crucially, they do not study long-term equilbrium effects. By construction, in our problem we
can leverage behavioral game theory to make more informed predictions of counterfactuals
to time points after the intervention at which the distribution of outcomes has stabilized.
Another approach, common in econometrics, is the difference-in-differences (DID) esti-
mator (Card and Krueger, 1994; Donald and Lang, 2007; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011). In
our case, this method is not perfectly applicable because there are no observations before
the intervention, but we can still entertain the idea by considering period t = 1 as the pre-
intervention period. The DID estimator compares the difference in outcomes before and after
the intervention for both the treated and control groups. In our application, this estimator
takes the value
τˆ did = cᵀ(α1(t0;Z)− α1(1;Z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in revenue for game 2
− cᵀ(α0(t0;Z)− α0(1;Z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in revenue for game 1
= −$0.164. (5)
This estimate is also far from the true value similar to the naive estimate. The DID estimator
is unbiased for τ only if there is an additive structure in the actions (Abadie, 2005), (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008) (Section 5.2), e.g., αj(t;Z) = µj + λt + jt, where µj is a policy-specific
parameter, λt is a temporal parameter, and  is noise. The DID estimator thus captures a
linear trend in the data by assuming a common parameter for both treatment arms (λt) that
is canceled out in subtraction in Eq. (5). The extent to which an additivity assumption is
reasonable depends on the application, however, by definition, it implies ignorability of the
assignment (i.e., Z does not appear in the model of aj(t;Z)), and thus it relies on assumptions
that are stronger than our assumptions (Abadie, 2005; Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
In a structural approach, Athey et al. (2011) studied the effects of timber auction format
(ascending versus sealed bid) on competition for timber tracts. They estimated bidder val-
uations from observed data in one auction and imputed counterfactual bid distributions in
the other auction, under the assumption of equilibrium play in both auctions. This approach
makes two critical implicit assumptions that together are stronger than Assumption 3. First,
the bidder valuation distribution is assumed to be a primitive that can be used to impute
counterfactuals in other treatment assignments. In other words, the assignment is inde-
pendent of bidder values, and thus it is strongly ignorable. Second, although imputation
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is performed for potential outcomes in equilibrium, which captures the notion of long-term
effects, inference is performed under the assumption of equilibrium play in the observed
outcomes, and thus temporal dynamic behavior is assumed away.
Finally, another popular approach to causality is through directed acyclical graphs (DAGs)
between the variables of interest (Pearl, 2000). For example, Bottou et al. (2013) studied
the causal effects of the machine learning algorithm that scores online ads in the Bing
search engine on the search engine revenue. Their approach was to create a full DAG
of the system including variables such as queries, bids, and prices, and made a Causal
Markov assumption for the DAG. This allows to predict counterfactuals for the revenue
under manipulations of the scoring algorithm, using only observed data generated from the
assumed DAG. However, a key assumption of the DAG approach is that the underlying
structural equation model is stable under the treatment assignment, and only edges coming
from parents of the manipulated variable need to be removed; as before, assignment is
considered strongly ignorable. As pointed out by Dash and Druzdzel (2001) this might be
implausible in equilibrium systems. Consider, for example, a system where X → Y ← Z,
and a manipulation that sets the distribution of Y independently of X,Z. Then after
manipulation the two edges will need to be removed. However, if in an equilibrium it is
required that Y ≈ XZ, then the two arrows should be reversed after the manipulation.
Proper causal inference in equilibrium systems through causal graphs remains an open area
without a well-established methodology (Dash, 2005).
Finally we note that there exists the concept of Granger causality (Granger, 1988), which
remains important in econometrics. The central idea in Granger causality is predictability,
in particular the ability of lagged iterates of a time series x(t) to predict future values of
the outcome of interest, which in our case is the population action αj(t;Z). This causality
concept does not take into account the randomization from the experimental design, which
is key in statistical causal inference.
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D Application: Rapoport and Boebel (1992) data
The following tables report the payoff matrix structure (Table 1 used by Rapoport and
Boebel) and the observed data (Table 2), as reported by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
Table 1: Normal-form game in the experiment of Rapoport and Boebel (values L and W are
specified as described in the body of the paper) (Rapoport and Boebel, 1992).
a′1 a
′
2 a
′
3 a
′
4 a
′
5
a1 W L L L L
a2 L L W W W
a3 L W L L W
a4 L W L W L
a5 L W W L L
Table 2: Experimental data of Rapoport and Boebel Rapoport and Boebel (1992), as re-
ported by McKelvey and Palfrey McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). The data includes frequency
of actions for the row agent and the column agent in the experiment, broken down by
game and session. Gray color indicates that we assume the data to be long-term and thus
we hold them out of data analysis and only use them to measure predictive performance.
(Note: There are five total actions available to every player according to the payoff struc-
ture in Table 1. The frequencies for actions a5, a
′
5 can be inferred because
∑5
i=1 ai = 1 and∑5
i=1 a
′
i = 1.)
row agent column agent
Game Period a1 a2 a3 a4 a
′
1 a
′
2 a
′
3 a
′
4
1 1 0.308 0.307 0.113 0.120 0.350 0.218 0.202 0.092
1 2 0.293 0.272 0.162 0.100 0.333 0.177 0.190 01.40
1 3 0.273 0.350 0.103 0.123 0.353 0.133 0.258 0.102
1 4 0.295 0.292 0.113 0.135 0.372 0.192 0.222 0.063
2 1 0.258 0.367 0.105 0.143 0.332 0.115 0.245 0.140
2 2 0.290 0.347 0.118 0.110 0.355 0.198 0.208 0.108
2 3 0.355 0.313 0.082 0.100 0.355 0.215 0.187 0.110
2 4 0.323 0.270 0.093 0.105 0.343 0.243 0.168 0.107
E More details on Bayesian computation
Here we offer more details about the choices in implementing Algorithm 1 in Section 4.1 of
the main paper. For convenience we repeat the content of Section 4.1 in the main paper and
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then expand with our details.
Step 1: Model parameters. For simplicity we assume that the models in the two games
share common parameters, and thus (φ1, ψ1, λ1) = (φ0, ψ0, λ0) ≡ (φ, ψ, λ), where λ are the
parameters of the behavioral model to be described in Step 8. Having common parameters
also acts as regularization and thus helps estimation. We emphasize that this simplification
is not necessary as we could have two different set of parameters for each game. It is crucial,
however, that the parameters are stable with respect to the treatment assignment because
we need to extrapolate from the observed assignment to the counterfactual ones.
Step 4: Sampling parameters and initial behaviors As explained later we assume
that there are 3 different behaviors and thus φ, ψ, λ are vectors with 3 components. Let
x ∼ U(m,M) denote that every component of x is uniform on (m,M), independently. We
choose diffuse priors for our parameters, specifically, φ ∼ U(0, 10), ψ ∼ U(−5, 5), and λ ∼
U(−10, 10). Given φ we sample the initial behaviors in the two games as β1(0;Z) ∼ Dir(φ)
and β0(0;Z) ∼ Dir(φ), independently.
Regarding the particular choices of these distributions, we first note that φ needs to have
positive components because it is used as an argument to the Dirichlet distribution. Larger
values than 10 could be used for the components of φ but the implied Dirichlet distributions
would not differ significantly than the ones we use in our experiments. Regarding λ we note
that its components are used in quantities of the form eλ[k]u and so it is reasonable to bound
them, and the interval [−5, 5] is diffuse enough given the values of u implied by the payoff
matrix in Table 1. Finally the prior for the temporal model parameters, ψ, is also diffuse
enough. An alternative would be to use a multivariate normal distribution as the prior for
ψ but this would not alter the procedure significantly.
Steps 5 & 7: Pivot to counterfactuals. Since we have a completely randomized
experiment (A/B test) it holds that ρZ = 0.5 and therefore β
(0) = 0.5(β1(0;Z) + β0(0;Z)).
Now we can pivot to the counterfactual population behaviors under Z = 1 and Z = 0 by
setting β1(0; 1) = β0(0; 0) = β
(0).
Step 8: Sample counterfactual behavioral history. As the temporal model, we
adopt the lag-one vector autoregressive model, also known as VAR(1). We transform2 the
population behavior into a new variable wt = logit(β1(t; 1)) ∈ R2 (also do so for β0(t; 0)).
2The map y = logit(x) is defined as the function ∆m → Rm−1 such that, for vectors y = (y1, . . . , ym−1)
and x = (x1, . . . , xm),
∑
i xi = 1, and x1 6= 0 wlog, indicates that yi = log(xi+1/x1), for i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
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Such transformation with a unique inverse is necessary because population behaviors are
constrained on the simplex, and thus form so-called compositional data (Aitchison, 1986;
Grunwald et al., 1993). The VAR(1) model implies that
wt = ψ[1]1 + ψ[2]wt−1 + ψ[3]t, (6)
where ψ[k] is the kth component of ψ and t ∼ N (0, I) is i.i.d. standard bivariate normal.
Eq. (6) is used to sample the behavioral history, Bj, from t = 0 to t = T , as described in
Step 8 of Algorithm 1.
Such sampling is straightforward to do. We simply need to sample the random noises
t for every t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, and then compute each wt successively. Given the sample
{wt : t = 0, . . . , T} we can then transform back to calculate the population behaviors
β1(t; 1) = {logit−1(wt) : t = 0, . . . , T}—for B0 we repeat the same procedure with a new
sample of t since the two games share the same temporal model parameters ψ.
Step 9: Behavioral model. Here we rewrite the specifics of the behavioral model with
more details. In QLp agents possess increasing levels of sophistication. Following earlier
work Wright and Leyton-Brown (2010), we adopt p = 3, and thus consider a behavioral
space with three different behaviors B = {b0, b1, b2}.
Recall that a behavior ∈ B represents the distribution of actions that an agent will play
conditional on adopting that behavior. In QLp such distributions depend on an assumption
of quantal response, which is defined as follows. Let u ∈ R|A| denote a vector such that ua
is the expected utility of an agent taking action a ∈ A, and let Gj denote the payoff matrix
in game j as in Table 1. If an agent is facing another agent with strategy (distribution
over actions) b, then u = Gjb. The quantal best-response with parameter x determines the
distribution of actions that the agent will take facing expected utilities u, and is defined as
QBR(u;x) = expit(xu),
where, for a vector y with elements yi, expit(y) is a vector with elements exp(yi)/
∑
i exp(yi).
The parameter x ≥ 0 is called the precision of the quantal best-response. If x is very large
then the response is closer to the classical Nash best-response, whereas if x = 0 the agent
ignores the utilities and randomizes among actions.
Let λ = (λ[1], λ[2], λ[3]) be the precision parameters. Let α(b) denote the distribution
26
over actions implied for an agent who adopts behavior. Given λ the model QL3 calculates
α(bk), for k = 0, 1, 2, as follows:
• Agents who adopt b0, termed level-0 agents, have precision λ0 = 0, and thus will
randomly pick one action from the action space A. Thus,
α(b0) = QBR(u; 0) = (1/|A|)1,
regardless of the argument u.
• An agent who adopts b1, termed level-1 agent, has precision λ[1] and assumes that
is playing against a level-0 type agent. Thus, the agent is facing a vector of utilities
u1 = Gjb0, and so
α(b1) = QBR(u1;λ[1]).
• An agent who adopts b2, termed level-2 agent, has precision λ[3] and assumes is playing
against a level-1 agent with precision λ[2]. Thus, it estimates that it is facing strategy
α(1)2 = QBR(u1;λ[2]), where u1 = Gjb0 as above. The expected utility vector of the
level-2 agent is u2 = Gjα(1)2, and thus
α(b2) = QBR(u2;λ[3]).
Given Gj and λ we can therefore write down a 5 × 3 matrix Qj = [α(b0), α(b1), α(b2)]
where the kth column is the distribution over actions played by an agent conditional on
adopting behavior bk−1. Conditional on population action βj(t;Z) the expected population
action is α¯j(t;Z) = Qjβj(t;Z). The population action αj(t;Z) is distributed as a multino-
mial with expectation α¯j(t;Z), and so P (αj(t; 1)|βj(t; 1), Gj) = Multi(|I| ·αj(t; 1); α¯j(t; 1)),
where Multi(n, p) is the multinomial density of observations n = (n1, . . . , nK) with expected
frequencies p = (p1, . . . , pK). Hence, the full likelihood for observed actions in game j re-
quired in Steps 10 and 11 of Algorithm 1 is given by the product
P (Dj|Bj, λj, Gj) =
T−1∏
t=0
Multi(|I| · αj(t; j1); α¯j(t; j1)).
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